




When asymmetric cryptology?


- if manual secret key installation not feasible (also in point-to-point)
- open networks (no prior customer relation or contract)
- get rid of risk of central key store
- mutually distrusting parties - strong non-repudiation of origin is needed
- fancy properties: e-voting


Important lesson: on-line trust relationships should reflect real-word trust relationships






























Control vectors in the IBM 4758 (1)


- · Potted in epoxy resin
- Protective tamper-sensing membrane, chemically identical to potting compound
- Detectors for temperature & X-Rays
- "Tempest" shielding for RF emission
- · Low pass filters on power supply rails
- Multi-stage "latching" boot sequence
- = STATE OF THE ART PROTECTION!


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Features of the IBM 4758 Control vector: type (e.g., PIN, data, MAC) store key of type type as E Km + "type" (k) Output of encryption with key of type "PIN" is never allowed to leave the box Output of encryption with key of type data, MAC, ... may leave the box High security master key import: 3 shares Import Km as Km_A + Km_B + Km_C







Lessons learned: security APIs


- Complex 150 commands
- · Need to resist to insider frauds
- Hard to design can go wrong in many ways
- Need more attention
- Further reading: Mike Bond, Cambridge University http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/mkb23/research.html

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"Efficient padding oracle attacks on cryptographic hardware" (PKCS#11 devices) [Bardou+ 12] most attacks take less than 100 milliseconds

Device	PKCS#1v1.5		CBC pad	
	token	session	token	session
Aladdin eTokenPro	Х	Х	Х	Х
Feitian ePass 2000	OK	OK	N/A	N/A
Feitian ePass 3003	OK	OK	N/A	N/A
Gemalto Cyberflex	Х	N/A	N/A	N/A
RSA Securid 800	Х	N/A	N/A	N/A
Safenet iKey 2032	Х	Х	N/A	N/A
SATA dKey	OK	OK	OK	OK
Siemens CardOS	X	X (89 secs)	N/A	N/A





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
Key establishment protocols: subtle flaws


37


- Person-in-the middle attack – Lack of protected identifiers
- Reflection attack
- Triangle attack


Attack model: Needham and Schroeder [1978]:


We assume that the intruder can interpose a computer in all communication paths, and thus can alter or copy parts of messages, replay messages, or emit false material. While this may seem an extreme view, it is the only safe one when designing authentication protocols.















Lessons from Needham-Schroeder (1995)

- Prudent engineering practice (Abadi & Needham): include names of principals in all messages
- IKE v2 plausible deniability: don't include name of correspondent in signed messages: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/02nov/I-D/draft-ietf-ipsec-soi-features-01.txt



Why is protocol design so hard?

- Understand the security properties offered by existing protocols
- Understand security requirements of novel applications
- Understanding implicit assumptions about the environment underpinning established properties and established security mechanisms

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
And who are Alice and Bob anyway?

- Users?
- Smart cards/USB tokens of the users?
- Computers?
- Programs on a computer?

If Alice and Bob are humans, they are vulnerable to social engineering

Random number generation

- "The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance"
- John Von Neumann, 1951: "Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin"
- Used for
 - Key generation
 - Encryption and digital signatures
 - (randomization)
 - Protocols (nonce)



Key generation: hardware entropy sources

- · radioactive decay
- reverse biased diode
- · free running oscillators
- radio
- · audio, video
- hard disk access time (air turbulence)
- manually (dice)
- lava lamps

Risk: physical attacks, failure

Key generation: software entropy sources

- system clock
- elapsed time between keystrokes or mouse movements
- content of input/output buffers
- user input
- operating system values (system load, network statistics)
- interrupt timings

Risk: monitoring, predictable

Key generation: monitoring

- Statistical tests (NIST FIPS 140)
- typical tests: frequency test, poker test, run's test
- necessary but not sufficient
- 5 lightweight tests to verify correct operation continuously
- stronger statistical testing necessary during design phase, after production and before installation

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State update

- Keep updating entropy pool and extracting inputs from entropy pool to survive a state compromise
- Combine both entropy pool and existing state with a non-invertible function (e.g., SHA-512, x² mod n,...)

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Output function

- · One-way function of the state since for some applications the random numbers become public
- A random string is not the same as a random integer mod p
- A random integer/string is not the same as a random prime



- O/S · restore entropy pool (seed file) from a backup and
- start right away use the list of random numbers from the RAND
- Corporation
- · use numbers from http://www.random.org/ - 66198 million random bits served since October 1998
- use digits from π , e, π/e ,...
- use linear congruential generators [Knuth] $-x_{n+1} = a x_n + b \mod m$

RSA moduli

 Generate a 1024-bit RSA key Use random bit generation to pick random a integer r in the interval [2⁵¹²,2⁵¹³-1]


If r is even r:=r+1

Do r:=r+2 until r is prime; output p Do r:=r+2 until r is prime; output q


What is the problem?

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
55



- D. Wagner's web resource: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/rnd/
- P. Gutmann, http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/2310
- Outmann, mcyartosarcuspace auchanovae. International 2012 2110
 Dorrendorf, Z. Gutterman, Benny Pinkas, Cryptanalysis of the Windows random number generator. ACM CCS 2007, pp. 476-485
 Gutterman, Benny Pinkas, T. Reinman, Analysis of the Linux random number generator. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2006, pp. 371-385



- · Hardware security module
- PUFs: Physical Uncloneable Functions




Implementation attacks cold boot attack


Why break cryptography? Go for the key!

Data reminence in DRAMs

Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys [Halderman Schoen-Heninger-Clarkson-Paul-Calandrino-Feldman-Appelbaum-Felten'08]

- Works for AES, RSA,...
- $\ Products: BitLocker, FileVault, TrueCrypt, dm-crypt, loop-AES$





How to back-up keys • Backup is essential for decryption keys

- Security of backup is crucial
- Secret sharing: divide a secret over n users so that any subset of t users can reconstruct it

Destroying keys securely is harder than you think

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Implementing digital signatures is hard

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- ElGamal
- RSA

The risks of ElGamal (1/3)


- ElGamal-type signatures (including DSA, ECDSA)
- public parameters: prime number p, generator g (modulo p operation omitted below)
- private key x, public key y = g^x
- signature (r,s)


\$ 11 000

- generate temporary private key k and public key $r = g^k$
- solve s from $h(m) \equiv x r + k s \mod (p-1)$
- verification:
 - Signature verification: 1 < r < p and $h(m) \equiv y^r r^s \mod p$

The risks of ElGamal (2/3)

- long term keys: y = g^x
- short term keys: r = g^k
- the value k has to be protected as strongly as the value x
 - Ex. 1: NIST had to redesign the DSA FIPS standard because of a subtle flaw in the way k was generated [Bleichenbacher'01]
 - Ex 2: attack on ElGamal as implemented in GPG [Nguyen'03]






Problematic public keys (2/3)

- low entropy during key generation
- RSA keys easy to factor, because they form pairs like: n = p.q and n' = p'.q so gcd(n,n')=q
- DSA keys: reuse of randomness during signing or weak key generation
 - why ???
- embedded systems
 routers, server management cards,

management cards, network security devices key generation at first boot

RSA versus DSA Ron was wrong, Whit is right or vice versa?



More PRNG flaws


- 1996: Netscape SSL [Goldberg-Wagner]
- · 2008: Debian SSL [Bello]
- 15 Aug. 2013: Android Java and OpenSSL PRNG flaw led to theft of Bitcoins
- · Sept. 2013: Bullrun and DUAL_EC_DRBG


16 Sept. 2013 Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards: Coppersmith in the wild [Bernstein-Chang-Cheng-Chou-Heninger-Lange-van Someren'13] IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2013: 599

184 keys from Taiwan Citizen Digital Certificate cards card + OS: EAL 4+; FIPS 140-2 Level 2

How to sign with RSA?

- public key: (n,e)
- private key: d
- $s = t^d \mod n = t^{1/e} \mod n$
- But
 - message M is often larger than modulus n
 - RSA(x*y) = RSA(x)*RSA(y)
 - RSA(0) = 0, RSA(1) = 1,...
- · Solution: hash and add redundancy
 - PKCS #1
 - RSA-PSS





Fix of Bleichenbacher's attack
Write proper verification code (but the signer cannot know which code the verifier will use)
Use a public exponent that is at least 32 bits
Upgrade – finally – to RSA-PSS

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Conclusion Implementing cryptography requires a high level of cryptographic expertise Application developers should become specialists "A specialist is someone who knows when to call an expert" [Peter Landrock]